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I. INTRODUCTION
The stunning financial collapse experienced by Argentina at
the turn of the century undoubtedly had far-reaching effects in
many arenas. The overnight failure of its economic system was an
especially unwelcome development for the dozens of multinational
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, University of Miami; M.B.A. Candidate, May 2008,
University of Miami; B.A., University of Miami, 2004. I want to thank Professors
Robert Rosen and Pedro Martinez-Fraga for introducing me to international
arbitration and my colleagues on the Inter-American Law Review for their tireless
help, especially Sunjay Trehan and Jordan Dresnick for their valuable advice.
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corporations that had made significant investments in Argentine
industries and public utilities.' Many of these companies, includ-
ing Vivendi and Enron,' immediately turned for relief to interna-
tional arbitration mechanisms that were placed in the Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs) between Argentina and their home
states.' Among the most frequently invoked arbitration organiza-
tions in the wake of the crisis was the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (the ICSID).4 Prior to this
boom, the ICSID, an independent international agency related to
the World Bank, was comparatively untested and largely
underutilized.5 Currently, however, of the 110 cases pending
before the ICSID6 nearly thirty percent involve Argentina and
arose from the 2001 financial crisis.7
Five years removed from the devastating crisis, the vast
majority of cases brought before the ICSID have not been
resolved, although the economy has made a striking rebound.8
However, several cases have been decided, and others are cur-
rently being appealed. Although the ICSID does not strictly
observe the legal principle of stare decisis as American courts do,
previous decisions carry a great deal of weight.9 Thus, close analy-
sis of the ICSID Tribunal's conclusions is undoubtedly valuable.
These decisions may shed light on how to resolve remaining cases
and others that will arise from Latin America, given the recent,
dramatic political and economic volatility in the region.
In large measure, CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argen-
1. See Paolo Di Rosa, The Recent Wave of Arbitrations Against Argentina Under
Bilateral Investment Treaties: Background and Principal Legal Issues, 36 U. MiAMI.
INTER-AM. L. REV. 41, 42 (2004).
2. See World Bank Group, ISCID List of Pending Cases, http://www.worldbank.
org/icsidlcases/pending.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2007) [hereinafter ISCID List of
Pending Cases].
3. See Di Rosa, supra note 1 at 41.
4. See generally David R. Sedlak, ICSID's Resurgence In International
Investment Arbitration: Can the Momentum Hold?, 23 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 147, 158
(2004) (noting the recent increased number of ICSID arbitrations).
5. See STEPHEN J. TOOPE, MIXED INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: STUDIES IN
ARBITRATION BETWEEN STATES AND PRIVATE PERSONS 253 (Grotius Publ'ns Ltd. 1990).
6. See ISCID List of Pending Cases, supra note 2 (referencing data current as of
Apr. 1, 2007).
7. See id.
8. See Larry Rohter, Economic Rally For Argentines Defies Forecasts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 2004, at 11.
9. See Lauren E. Godshall, In the Cold Shadow of Metalclad: The Potential for
Change to NAFTA's Chapter Eleven, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 264, 306 (2002).
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tine Republic may prove to be a seminal case." As the first of the
cases emanating from the Argentine financial crisis to result in an
award," it will likely serve as an important model and thus merits
significant study. Freshfield Bruckhaus Deringer, the interna-
tional firm which represented CMS, noted that "[a]lthough the
decision of one ICSID tribunal is not binding on another, this
award will undoubtedly be an important precedent in the cases
that follow it.""
Further, significant consideration must be given to the meth-
ods employed by the Argentine government against those bringing
suit against it. Argentina has consistently sought to obstruct the
ICSID arbitration process and has largely, though not entirely,
succeeded. 3 While the ICSID is conceptually regarded by some as
the most efficient of the major arbitration mechanisms, Argentina
has employed the ICSID's abundant safeguards to perpetuate the
arbitration process, at great expense to the plaintiffs.14 Also,
Argentina has challenged the authority of the ICSID, at times
suggesting that potential awards would not be recognized. 5
Finally, the dramatic post-crash rebound of the Argentine econ-
omy once again made it an enticing market for international
investment. 6 The consequent interest of international corpora-
tions (including many of the parties bringing suit before the
ICSID) to invest in Argentina once again has resulted in the inter-
estingly frequent willingness of companies to drop suits against
Argentina. 7 This development undoubtedly merits analysis.
In sum, the Argentine financial crisis has proven to be a
profound test of the ICSID arbitration mechanism. While there
have undeniably been numerous challenges to the system, one
might argue that it has withstood the significant pressures initi-
10. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID No. ARB/01/8,
44 I.L.M. 1205 (2005).
11. See Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, International Arbitration: Bilateral
Investment Treaties (US/Argentina), http://www.freshfields.com/practice/dispute
resolution/publications/pdfs/12397.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2007) [hereinafter
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer].
12. See id.
13. See generally Di Rosa, supra note 1 (Di Rosa points to several jurisdictional
objections raised that have consistently been rejected by ICSID tribunals).
14. See id.
15. See Michael Casey, Azurix Wins $165 Million vs Argentina in Latest ICSID
Ruling, Dow JoNEs NEWSWIRES, July 18, 2006, available at http://www.bilaterals.org/
article.php3?id-article=5535.
16. See Larry Rohter, Argentina, Turning Corner, Leans to the Left, N.Y. TIMES,
May 18, 2003, (Money and Business) at 1.
17. See id.
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ated thus far. Ultimately, however, a final challenge lurks in the
distance: the collection of awards against the Argentine Republic.
Although this final challenge still lays several years into the
future, the ICSID has a very promising, though largely untested,
mechanism for collection of awards.'"
The ball now lies squarely in Argentina's court. Despite anti-
investment rumblings and a seemingly unfriendly outlook
towards the ICSID, Argentina's leadership must make an essen-
tial choice. They must choose whether to continue to press
against the enforcement of ICSID awards, which if the CMS
award is to be used as persuasive precedent in subsequent cases,
are likely to be unfavorable to the Republic. This dilemma
presents the complex choice between short-term political esteem
and the long-term economic health of the Republic. Choosing the
former would be nothing short of a pyrrhic victory as it likely
would be made at the detriment of the latter.
Section I introduces the reader to the important historical
events that have led to the current state of affairs. A brief over-
view of the World Bank and its related arbitration mechanism,
ICSID, will acclimate the reader with both institutions. An over-
view of the Argentine Financial Crisis and a discussion of the
political conditions that led to the election of Nestor Kirchner as
President of the Argentine Republic follows. Section II addresses
the merits issues (including BIT Umbrella Clauses and expropria-
tion) resolved by the ICSID Tribunal in the CMS Gas Transmis-
sion Co. v. Argentine Republic award. Section III addresses
Argentine political interference in the ICSID Tribunal's rendering
of an award and its future enforcement. Among the specific con-
flicts discussed are potential domestic constitutional challenges,
requests for the annulment of the award, and pressure applied on
other parties to withdraw from arbitrations. Finally, Section IV
addresses the possible consequences of future Argentine
challenges.
A. A Brief Introduction to ICSID
The World Bank, established amid the ruins of World War II,
pursuant to the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944, was intended
initially to aid in the reconstruction of Europe. 9 Its first loan, in
18. See Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 72.
19. See World Bank Group, World Bank History, www.worldbank.org/archives
(follow "history" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
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1947, was for $250 million to France.2" Over the years, as the
bank played an increasingly important role in the world, member
states asked the President of the Bank to act as an intermediary
in disputes.21 The first such instance occurred in 1951 when
Eugene Black, then the Bank's President, agreed to mediate a dis-
pute between the United Kingdom and Iran.2 Although this ini-
tial attempt at dispute resolution by the Bank failed due to
Iranian suspicions that Mr. Black favored the U.K., additional
requests for the Bank's involvement in dispute settlement contin-
ued to be made.23 By 1965, it became clear that while the Presi-
dent of the Bank understood the importance of his role as a
mediator, he was also reluctant to expand the Bank's mission
beyond its "fundamental role of giving loans and guarantees for
the financing of projects of high economic priority in less devel-
oped states. 24 Essentially, the Bank could not continue to expand
its role as "the judge" if it were to carry on its intended purpose of
being "the Banker."
2
Work on the formation of a related, but independent dispute
resolution branch, the ICSID, began in 1961.26 The Bank's Board
of Governors approved the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States (the ICSID Convention) in March 1965.27 The ICSID began
operations in October 1966.2' As of December 15, 2006, 155 States
had signed the ICSID Convention.29
Although the organization has generally been compared to
other major arbitration mechanisms around the world, including
the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of
International Arbitration, there are several key differences. 0 For
one, ICSID tribunals convene on an ad hoc basis; there are no
standing tribunals as there are in the other two institutions.3
20. Id.
21. See K.V.S.K. NATHAN, ICSID CONVENTION: THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 47 (Juris Publ'g 2000).
22. See id. at 48.
23. See id.
24. Id. at 49 (citation omitted).
25. See id.
26. See id. at 50-51.
27. See id. at 51.
28. See id.
29. World Bank Group, ICSID List of Contracting States, http://www.worldbank.
org/icsid/constate/c-states-en.htm [hereinafter ICSID List of Contracting States] (last
visited Apr. 1, 2007).
30. See NATHAN, supra note 21, at 51.
31. See id.
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Panels form according to the requirements of the Convention,
which grants the parties significant discretion.2 The ICSID also
hears cases between states and investors, whereas the other two
institutions may only do so indirectly."
The ICSID was founded under the general principle that it
should treat international investors and host states equitably,34
especially "considering the need for international cooperation for
economic development, and the role of private international
investment therein .... " In fact, the Convention's Preamble
recognizes that "while such disputes would usually be subject to
national legal processes, international methods of settlement may
be appropriate in certain cases .... ",36 Stephen Toope effectively
illustrates the consequent dynamic the preamble establishes,
"Investors will tend to be better protected under ICSID than
under the legal system of a developing state."3 "The state will
tend to lose the ability to give free rein to auto-interpretive
notions of sovereignty. The quid pro quo may be increased foreign
private sector investment."3 As noted earlier, flexibility has long
been regarded as an important aspect of ICSID arbitrations and
parties are given a "wide range of options regarding their ability
to control the arbitration procedure . .. [i] n general, the parties
can shape many of the arbitration rules for themselves, as long as
there is an agreement between them regarding these rules."39
ICSID experienced tremendous growth over the last decade.4"
32. The Convention merely requires that "the Tribunal shall consist of a sole
arbitrator or any uneven number of arbitrators appointed as the parties shall agree."
See International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID], art.
37, Aug. 27, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention],
available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/partA.htm. However, in the
event that the parties cannot agree on "the number of arbitrators and the method of
their appointment," the Convention requires that "the Tribunal shall consist of three
arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each party and the third, who shall be the
president of the Tribunal, appointed by agreement of the parties." Id.
33. Id. ("Both the Hague institutions [the International Court of Justice and the
Permanent Court of International Arbitration] only hear disputes between states
themselves of between states and private parties through the intervention of states.").
34. TooPE, supra note 5, at 219.
35. ICSID Convention, supra note 32, pmbl.
36. Id.
37. See TooPE, supra note 5, at 222-23 & n.15 (asserting that this is due to "the
neutrality of the forum").
38. Id. at 223.
39. MOSHE HiRscH, THE ARBITRATION MECHANISM OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE
FOR THE SE'TTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 28 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993).
40. See generally Sedlak, supra note 4 (describing the resurgence of ICSID in
international investment arbitration).
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Two main reasons are cited for this impressive increase: (1) the
"[r]ise in the [nIumber of [s]ignatories" to the ICSID Convention,
and (2) the "[rise in the [nIumber of BITs."41 In 1991, Professor
Jan Paulsson specifically predicted that the number of ICSID
arbitrations would increase dramatically over the next twenty-five
years as more states, especially Latin American states, signed the
Convention.4 2 Interestingly, Argentina signed the ICSID Conven-
tion that same year 3 and would soon contribute to the vindication
of Professor Paulsson's propitious forecast, as the remarkable
number of ICSID arbitrations originating in Latin America would
lead some to describe this era as ICSID's "Arbitration Boom.""
B. Boom... then Bust: The Argentine Financial
Crisis
Eduardo Alberto Duhalde assumed the Office of President of
the Republic of Argentina on January 2, 2002 in the midst of a
dramatic and devastating economic crash.4" He was the fifth man
to hold that office in a span of two weeks after the resignation of
Fernando de la Rua on December 21 of the previous year.46
Although the crisis seemingly culminated in the final weeks of
2001, it was, in fact, years in the making. Many trace the 2001
crisis to the economic reforms instituted by Argentine President
Carlos Menem over a decade earlier. Ironically, these reforms
initially were credited for Argentina's economic renaissance of the
1990s.41
Menem, elected in 1989, inherited a distressed country.49
Crippled by the economic mismanagement of a staid military
41. Id. at 158, 159.
42. See Jan Paulsson, ICSID's Achievements and Prospects, 6 ICSID REV.:
FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 380, 398 (1991).
43. See ICSID List of Contracting States, supra note 29.
44. See Carlyn Kolker, Arbitration Boom: The Rise of Left-Leaning Governments in
Latin America has Corporate Clients Heading to ADR Forums, 28 AM. LAW. 111
(2006).
45. See Georgios Theophanous, Duhalde's Dilemma: Argentina in Crisis, 25 HARv.
INT'L. REV. 8-9 (2003), available at http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1083/; Larry Rohter,
Populist Argentine Senator Steps In to Fill the Void, Becoming 5th President in 2
Weeks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2002, at A6 [hereinafter Rohter, Populist Argentine
Senator Steps In].
46. See Rohter, Populist Argentine Senator Steps In, supra note 45.
47. See generally U.S. Dep't. of State, Background Note: Argentina (Nov. 2006),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26516.htm [hereafter Background Note: Argentina]
(describing reforms instituted in the 1990's, and subsequent economic fallout).
48. See id.
49. See id.
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junta, Argentina acquired a huge debt as a result of the junta's
disastrous decision to engage the United Kingdom in the 1982 war
over the Falkland Islands (referred to as the Malvinas by Argen-
tines). 0 Following the 1983 reestablishment of democracy, the
nation plunged further economically, experiencing average infla-
tion of over 350% annually.5' This catastrophe largely formed the
backdrop for the bold reforms that Mr. Menem would put into
place in 1991, the second year of his term.52
Among the main components of Menem's reforms was the
implementation of the "Convertibility Plan."5 3 Menem based the
plan on two fundamental measures, in addition to a series of other
related policies. 54 The first measure aimed to "establish a fixed
exchange rate with the U.S. dollar" (with one peso worth one dol-
lar, and the two currencies treated essentially as equivalents) that
the Argentine government guaranteed.55 The government "also
promised not to issue new pesos except to buy foreign exchange...
and to absorb local currency when people wanted to buy dollars." 6
Ultimately, the high cost associated with maintaining this policy
lead the nation to financial ruin. The subsequent reversal of this
policy precipitated the arbitrations that would arise before the
ICSID.
The second key component of Menem's sweeping economic
reforms required the privatization of previously nationalized
industries, including utilities. 57 Most of the formerly state-owned
industries were privatized through long-term concessions and
licenses. 8 The government specifically sought to attract foreign
investors to acquire many of these businesses.59 A widely held
belief that the local market lacked potential investors with the
requisite capital and expertise needed to acquire, maintain, and,
ideally, improve the existing infrastructure motivated the
50. See id.
51. See Jorge Schvarzer, The Costs of the Convertibility Plan: The Economic and
Social Effects of Financial Hegemony, in BROKEN PROMISES? THE ARGENTINE CRISIS
AND ARGENTINE DEMOCRACY 71, 72 (Edward Epstein et al. eds., Rowman & Littlefield
Pub's 2006).
52. See id.




57. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID No. ARB/01/08,
44 I.L.M. 1205, 1211 (2005).
58. See Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 44.
59. See id. at 44-45.
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reform.6" The government rolled back many of the barriers that
had stood in the way of foreign investment in Argentina.6' It also
sought to raise Argentina's profile among international investors
by advertising the new, less burdensome regulations and, in some
instances, actively engaging potential investors.62
Additionally, Argentina aggressively sought, with great suc-
cess, to expand its network of BITs with nations representing
potential investors.63 In the 1990s alone, Argentina entered into
over fifty such BITs with nations throughout the world, of which
thirty-eight are still in force.64 These BITs largely set the ground
rules by which citizens of each of the party nations could invest in
the other.6' Further, in creating concession contracts, the govern-
ment included provisions purposely tailored to soothe investors'
concerns regarding the security of their investments in Argentine
utilities.66 One key provision, which would later come to play an
important role in the cases, regarded the process by which foreign
utilities computed the cost of the services to Argentine consum-
ers.67 Most concession contracts enabled the foreign investor to
compute their costs in U.S. dollars, then convert this amount to
pesos (under the prevailing exchange rate).68 At that time, the
prevailing exchange rate was conveniently set at one-to-one by
law.69 Although several such concessions were made to foreign
investors, Argentina, nevertheless, retained control of the fee
schedules through government regulatory agencies. 0 The system
seemed fairly stable at the time, reliance by foreign investors on
the goodwill and continued regulatory reform by the government
proved ill-advised.
The 1990s seemed to be a time of great progress for the
Argentine economy - inflation was under control and quality of
life improved dramatically.7' However, below the surface, pres-




64. See id.; World Bank Group, Bilateral Investment Treaties, http://www.world
bank.org/icsid/treaties/argentina.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
65. See Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 41.
66. See id. at 45.
67. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID No. ARB/01/8,
44 I.L.M. 1205, 1211 (2005).
68. See Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 45.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 45-46.
71. See id. at 46-47.
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sure was mounting on the system and sustaining the Convertibil-
ity Plan soon became a profound burden on the nation.72 Even
Menem announced that the current situation was unsustainable.73
By the turn of the century, a global economic downturn, coupled
with imprudent spending and tax initiatives, made the burden of
Convertibility too great. Menem's new financial order, which had
shown so much promise in the 1990s, soon would collapse.
As confidence in the peso began to falter, many Argentines
chose to convert their savings from pesos to dollars.74 Unable to
maintain its commitment of exchanging the currencies at a one-to-
one rate and facing a run on the banks, the Argentine government
soon placed a strict cap on the amount of money citizens could
withdraw from their own bank accounts. 5 Public disenchantment
with the government reached its peak following this decision.76
Soon protestors flooded the streets and paralyzed the nation.77
The government subsequently declared a "State of Siege" to no
avail.78
On January 6, 2002, the Argentine government enacted Law
25561, called the "Public Emergency Law of 2002."7' This law was
intended to remedy the dire situation.0 Among other things, the
Convertibility System was abandoned in favor of a market
approach to currency valuation.8 ' The value of the peso promptly
fell from its previous rate of one-to-one with the dollar to approxi-
mately 3.90 pesos to one dollar.
8 2
Of specific interest to the subsequent litigation before ICSID,
however, was that the Public Emergency Law also required that
"privatized utility companies continue using a currency conver-
72. See Clifford Krauss, Former Argentine President Warns of Economic Peril,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2000, at C4.
73. See id. (quoting Mr. Menem, "'If we continue on this path, I think there will be
a devaluation, or a dollarization of the economy ... If things go on this way, we are
heading into a depression that could be dramatic for Argentina."').
74. See Clifford Krauss, Argentine Economy: Postponing the Inevitable, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at A10.
75. See Clifford Krauss, Argentina Limits Withdrawals as Banks Near Collapse,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at A3.
76. See id.
77. See Clifford Krauss, Reeling From Riots, Argentina Declares a State of Siege,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2001, at A3.
78. See id.
79. See Law No. 25561, Jan. 6, 2002, [LXII-A] A.D.L.A. 44.
80. See id. (recitals).
81. See id. (tit. III, art. 3).
82. See CHRISTINA DASEKING ET AL., LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS IN ARGENTINA 1
(Int'l Monetary Fund 2004).
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sion formula from dollars to pesos - for billing purposes - of one
dollar to one peso."83 Clearly, this requirement, as Paolo Di Rosa
notes, "substantially altered the economic and financial basis of
the utilities' business due to the sharp devaluation of the peso."84
Further, the law also required utility companies to provide the
same level of service.85 Thus, while the production costs born by
utility companies did not change, the fees the companies were
legally bound to charge Argentine consumers fell in value by more
than two-thirds (considering the devaluation of the peso).8 6
C. Subsequent Political Upheaval and the Kirchner
Era
As the economic boom of the 1990s screeched to a halt and the
Argentine economy dove into recession, the Government
responded by imposing strict financial policies intended to limit
the flight of capital and prevent the total collapse of the economy. 7
The policies, however, resulted in widespread discontent and
culminated in violent riots throughout the country, though
focused in Buenos Aires. The upheaval toppled the sitting Presi-
dent, Fernando de la Rua, who, as Menem's successor, had been in
office only two years.89
Following the two-day tenure of interim president Federico
Ramon Puerta, the Legislative Assembly elected Adolfo Rodriguez
83. Law No. 25561, art. 8 ("Disp6nese que a partir de la sanci6n de la presente ley,
en los contratos celebrados por la Administraci6n Pilblica bajo normas de derecho
piiblico, comprendidos entre ellos los de obras y servicios pdiblicos, quedan sin efecto
las cldusulas de ajuste en d6lar o en otras divisas extranjeras y las clusulas
indexatorias basadas en indices de precios de otros paises y cualquier otro mecanismo
indexatorio. Los precios y tarifas resultantes de dichas cliusulas, quedan establecidos
en pesos a la relaci6n de cambio UN PESO ($ 1) = UN DOLAR ESTADOUNIDENSE
(U$S 1) [sic]." (emphasis in original)) (translation by author).
84. Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 47.
85. See Law No. 25561, art. 10 ("Las disposiciones previstas en los articulos 80 y 90
de la presente ley, en ningdin caso autorizardn a las empresas contratistas o
prestadoras de servicios pfiblicos, a suspender o alterar el cumplimiento de sus
obligaciones.").
86. See Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 47-48. Di Rosa illustrates this with a very
effective example of a thirty peso bill which was formerly valued at thirty dollars to
the utility but which, given the new exchange rate, is now valued at only about ten
dollars.
87. See generally Larry Rohter, Within Hours, 2 Quit as Argentine Leader, N.Y.
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Saa to the Presidency on December 23, 2000. 9o Saa subsequently
announced that Argentina would default on its international debt
but insisted on maintaining currency parity with the dollar.9
Amid continued violence and unable to garner significant support
for his plan, Saa surprisingly resigned only seven days after his
election, on December 30, 2001.92 After yet another two-day
interim presidency, the Legislative Assembly elected the Peronist
leader Eduardo Duhalde.93 The fifth President in less than three
weeks, Duhalde promptly moved to pass legislation to abandon
Argentina's decade-long policy of currency parity with the dollar
and imposed the new restrictions on foreign investment that
would lead to the manifold subsequent arbitrations.94 Duhalde
also put social programs in place that were intended to pacify the
massive discontent that had led to the resignation of his predeces-
sors.95 Largely successful in mollifying the capital, Duhalde
served in office for over a year.96
On April 27, 2003, presidential elections were finally held and
former President Menem, who had instituted privatization and
currency parity in the early 1990s, narrowly won the first round
with twenty-four percent of the vote.97 However, he was forced
into a runoff against the relative outsider Nestor Kirchner, the
Governor of Santa Cruz, a province in the southern Patagonia
region of Argentina.9" After it appeared in polls that Menem
would lose handily to Mr. Kirchner, he pulled out of the runoff and
Kirchner subsequently assumed the office on May 25, 2003. 99
90. See Clifford Krauss, Argentine Leader Declares Default On Billions In Debt,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2001, at Al.
91. See Background Note: Argentina, supra note 47.
92. See id.; see also Larry Rohter, Argentina Drifts, Leaderless, as Economic
Collapse Looms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2002, at A3.
93. See Larry Rohter, Populist Argentine Senator Steps In to Fill the Void,
Becoming 5th President in 2 Weeks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2002, at A6.
94. See Larry Rohter, Argentina's New Leader Will Present Economic Plan Today,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2002, at A4. This legislation would become Emergency Law
25561. See Law No. 25561, Jan. 6, 2002, [LXII-A] A.D.L.A. 44.
95. See Larry Rohter, In Footsteps of Evita: Argentina's New First Lady, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2002, at A3 (noting that Hilda Duhalde, wife of President Eduardo
Duhalde, oversaw these governmental social programs).
96. See Larry Rohter, Signs of Life in Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003, at Wl.
97. See Larry Rohter, Menem Takes Early Lead in Argentine Presidential Election,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2003, at A3.
98. See Larry Rohter, Menem, Polls Slipping, Quits Argentine Race, N.Y. TIMES,
May 15, 2003, at A8.
99. See id.; Argentina: Kirchner Ya Es Presidente [Argentina: Kirchner Now Is
President], BBCMundo.com (May 25, 2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_
america/newsid_2935000/2935832.stm.
678
2007] CMS AWARD'S ARGENTINE IMPLICATIONS 679
A virtual unknown in Buenos Aires, Kirchner has since but-
tressed his support nationally and is now enormously popular
throughout his country.' ° However, he has adopted a very differ-
ent tone on international investment than his predecessors.' 01 The
Economist noted that Kirchner "revels in confrontation with polit-
ically unpopular foreign businesses .... 02 It further noted,
"Under President N6stor Kirchner, Argentina has taken up the
slogan 'a serious country.' But more than three years after its
devastating financial crisis, it has made few efforts to make
amends with foreign firms - not the least of those in its utilities
and energy sectors."0 3 Kirchner has challenged the validity of
ICSID awards, "indicat[ing] that he will ignore any rulings
against the government, even though failure to comply could lead
to trade sanctions." 4 Further, he has placed significant pressure
to withdraw on companies that are currently engaged in ICSID
arbitrations against Argentina.'
Anecdotes abound regarding Kirchner's prickly personality
and particular contempt for foreign investors who, he perceives,
were a major cause of the crippling economic crash his country
experienced. 106 Attending an international conference in Spain in
July 2003, Mr. Kirchner held a meeting with Spanish business
leaders, including the presidents of Telefonica and Repsol YPF,
both heavily invested in his nation.0 7 According to the Spanish
and Argentine newspapers, El Mundo and Clarin, respectively,
Kirchner told his powerful audience that they "should not com-
plain about the freezing of tariffs on public services . . . because
they had made sufficient money in Argentina during the 1990s. "l1s
Mr. Kirchner later noted, "I spoke with crudeness, but with dig-
100. See Larry Rohter, As Argentina's Debt Dwindles, President's Power Steadily
Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2006, at Al.
101. See ANDRES OPPENHEIMER, CUENTOS CHINOS: EL ENGARO DE WASHINGTON, LA
MENTINA POPULISTA Y LA ESPERANZA DE AMARICA LATINA [TALL TALES: THE
DECEPTION OF WASHINGTON, THE POPULIST LIE, AND THE HOPE OF LATIN AMERICA]
(Editorial Sudamericana 2005).
102. See Business in Argentina: Getting Serious, ECONOMIST, May 21, 2005, at 97
[hereinafter ECONOMIST, Getting Serious].
103. Id.
104. Taking on Foreigners, Again; Argentina, ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 2005, at 4
[hereinafter ECONOMIST, Taking on Foreigners].
105. See Luke Eric Peterson, Spanish Firm, Gas Natural, Drops Argentine Claim,
INVESTMENT LAW AND POL'Y NEWS BULL., Apr. 8, 2005, at 6, available at www.iisd.org/
pdff2005/investment investsdapril8_2005.pdf.
106. See OPPENHEIMER, supra note 101, at 166.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 166-67 (translation by author).
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nity. I believe that, not all, but many Spanish businesses bene-
fited greatly during the Menem era and I had to say that. Today
they must respect the rules of the game."109 The next day, El Pais,
a Madrid newspaper, ran the headline "Kirchner accuses Spanish
businesses of taking advantage of Argentina."1 '
Mr. Kirchner's disdain for foreign investment is certainly not
limited to those he faults for taking advantage of Argentina."1 '
Carly Fiorina, then the leader of Hewlett-Packard, visited Mr.
Kirchner in July 2004 with the express purpose of analyzing
potential investment opportunities. I12  Ms. Fiorina left Mr.
Krichner's office offended, however, after "he kept her waiting so
long that her patience gave out."'' Andr~s Oppenheimer notes
that when visiting Brazil on the same trip, Ms. Fiorina announced
that Hewlett-Packard would double its investment in Brazil after
meeting with Brazilian President Lula da Silva.1
14
Mr. Kirchner's idiosyncratic manner, called "the K-style,"11'
has generally proven rather politically effective with Argentines,
"whose traditional suspicion of [international investors] was exac-
erbated by the crisis that brought about the collapse of the econ-
omy .... 1116 Further, Kirchner has been credited, in large part,
with the stunning rebound that his country has experienced over
the last three years."7 The New York Times noted, "the economy
has grown by 8 percent for two consecutive years, exports have
zoomed, the currency is stable, investors are gradually returning
and unemployment has eased from record highs ... ."Is Some
observers have described this turnaround as nothing short of a
"'remarkable historical event.""' 9
109. Id. at 167 (quoting Dura Reuni6n de Kirchner con Empresarios, LA NACI6N,
July 18, 2003) (translation by author).
110. Id. (translation by author).
111. Id. Astute Latin American commentator Andr6s Oppenheimer asserts Mr.
Krichner's disdain for foreign investment is due, in part, to his leadership of an
isolated southern province with limited experience in international affairs.
112. See Waiting Game, FIN. TIMES (London), July 29, 2004, at 12.
113. Id.
114. See OPPENHEIMER, note 101, at 166.
115. Id. at 172-73.
116. Larry Rohter, Argentine Leader's Quirks Attract Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, DEC.
27, 2004, at A9; see OPPENHEIMER, supra note 101, at 172.
117. See Larry Rohter, As Argentina's Debt Dwindles, President's Power Steadily
Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2006, at Al.
118. Larry Rohter, Economic Rally For Argentines Defies Forecasts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 2004, at 1.
119. Id. (quoting economist Mark Weisbrot of the Center for Economic and Policy
Research in Washington, D.C.).
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II. THE CMS CASE: A DECISION ON THE MERITS
On July 26, 2001, a mere six months after the passage of
Emergency Law 25561, the ICSID received a Request for Arbitra-
tion against the Argentine Government from CMS Gas Transmis-
sion Company.12° This step formally initiated what would become
a nearly four-year-long process that would ultimately lead to an
award of over one hundred thirty-three million U.S. dollars in
favor of CMS, the claimant. 121 In order to appreciate the complex-
ity of the merits issues analyzed by the Tribunal, it is necessary to
review a decade of events that would, seemingly inexorably, lead
to the ICSID Tribunal in Washington.
A. Overview of CMS v. Argentine Republic
As a part Menem's broad 1989 reforms, 2 2 the Argentine Gov-
ernment specifically targeted the gas sector in its privatization
plans, using Law No. 24076 of 1992.123 The new legislation
divided Gas del Estado, the national gas company, into several
components for gas transportation and distribution. 124 The Gov-
ernment granted Transportadora de Gas del Norte (TGN), one of
the gas transportation components, a license to operate and
opened it to investors through a public tender offer.
12  CMS
claimed that the legislation, regulations, and TGN licensure fash-
ioned a legal framework for the conversion of tariffs and allowed
the tariffs to be "adjusted every six months in accordance with the
U.S. Producer Price Index. '
26
On July 7, 1995, CMS initiated the process by which it would
eventually purchase nearly thirty percent of TGN. 2 7 CMS' Offer-
ing Memorandum was based on the terms of the 1992 Information
Memorandum and the license, both prepared by Argentina. 128
CMS claimed that its investment in TGN totaled to almost $175
million.129
120. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID No. ARB/01/8,
44 I.L.M. 1205, 1206 (2005).
121. See id. at 1257.
122. See infra Section I.B.
123. See CMS Gas, 44 I.L.M. at 1211 (footnote omitted).
124. See id. (footnote omitted).
125. See id. (footnote omitted omitted).
126. Id.; see also infra Section I.B. The PPI is tracked by the U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics and is available at http://www.bls.gov/ppi/.
127. See CMS Gas, 44 I.L.M. at 1211. Initially, it purchased 25% of the company,
and it later purchased an additional 4.42%. See id.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 1213.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:3
As Argentina's economy progressively crumbled near the end
of the millennium, the Government called for a meeting with rep-
resentatives of the gas companies to discuss a temporary suspen-
sion of PPI adjustments to the gas tariffs.130 Although the
companies agreed to a suspension of the adjustments for six
months, they established that the deferral costs would be
recouped by the companies over the subsequent year.'31 This
agreement was not intended to set any precedent or change the
framework that had been adopted earlier. 3 2 According to the Tri-
bunal, however, it soon became apparent that the agreement to
adjust tariffs at the end of the six-month period would not be
implemented. 133 The "public regulatory agency of the gas indus-
try", ENARGAS, even directed TGN to "refrain from introducing"
adjustments of the tariffs as called for in the license agreement.
1 4
Subsequently, the gas companies held another meeting and,
once again, PPI increases were frozen for a period of two years.
35
However, a related decree was negotiated at this meeting and rep-
resented the new arrangements that had been made by the Gov-
ernment with the gas companies. 1 6 This decree "recognize[ed]
that the US PPI adjustment constituted 'a legitimately acquired
right' and was a basic premise and condition of the tender and the
offers.' 37 Soon thereafter, though, an Argentine court suspended
the agreement and the decree.' This suspension stemmed from a
pending challenge to the legality of the PPI adjustments and
TGN's persistent applications for tariff adjustments continued to
be denied.
39
The economic crash at the end of 2001 and the passing of
Emergency Law No. 25561 made the difficulties between the gas
companies and the Argentine government dramatically more com-
plex. '4 The new law envisioned a process of renegotiations of
existing licenses by a special "Renegotiation Commission. "141
However, this process moved slowly, largely due, according to
130. See id. at 1211.
131. See id. at 1211-12.








140. See id.; see also discussion infra Part II.B.
141. CMS Gas, 44 I.L.M. at 1212.
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Argentina, to the "inherent difficulty in renegotiating 64 public
utility contracts and numerous subcontracts."42
CMS asserted that it relied on Argentina's promises and
guarantees, in terms of the stated tariff adjustment and the cur-
rency exchange policies, in deciding whether to invest in TGN."'
A significant part of the losses that CMS claimed were related to
the fact that CMS' "ability to pay its debt had been reduced by a
factor or more than three because the debt [was] denominated in
US dollars and there ha[d] been an intervening devaluation of the
peso.' 44
B. Argentina's Preliminary Objections Addressed
Generally
Prior to hearing the case on its merits, the Tribunal
addressed a jurisdictional objection filed by Argentina. 14' As Paolo
Di Rosa notes in his careful review of the jurisdictional issues
addressed by the CMS Tribunal, "ICSID is a forum of limited
jurisdiction."46 In the event that a party files jurisdiction objec-
142. Id.
143. See id. at 1213.
144. Id.
145. See generally CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Rep. (Jurisdictional
Decision), ICSID No. ARB/01/8, 42 I.L.M. 788 (2003) (providing the jurisdictional
decision).
146. Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 49. Di Rosa further notes that Article 25 of the
ICSID Convention governs jurisdiction. See id. at n.18. Its requirements are as
follows: "(1) The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising
directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent
subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State)
and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent
in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no
party may withdraw its consent unilaterally. (2) 'National of another Contracting
State' means: (a) any natural person who had the nationality of a Contracting State
other than the State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented
to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration as well as on the date on which
the request was registered pursuant to paragraph (3) of Article 28 or paragraph (3) of
Article 36, but does not include any person who on either date also had the nationality
of the Contracting State party to the dispute; and (b) any juridical person which had
the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute on the
date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or
arbitration and any juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting
State party to the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, the
parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another Contracting State for
the purposes of this Convention. (3) Consent by a constituent subdivision or agency of
a Contracting State shall require the approval of that State unless that State notifies
the Centre that no such approval is required. (4) Any Contracting State may, at the
time of ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention or at any time
thereafter, notify the Centre of the class or classes of disputes which it would or would
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tions, as Argentina did in the CMS case on October 7, 2002,147 the
Tribunal may suspend proceedings on the merits issues, as the
CMS Tribunal chose. 14 Di Rosa further notes that Argentina has
consistently raised jurisdictional objections, despite the fact that,
in every instance, the judgments of the tribunals as to the objec-
tions have been "adverse to Argentina."49
Di Rosa divides the jurisdictional objections filed by Argen-
tina into four major categories: (1) Applicable law, (2) Sovereign
Prerogative, (3) Exclusive Jurisdiction and Waiver of Other Fora,
and (4) Ius Standi and Related Issues.'50 Argentina based its legal
objections largely on provisions of the ICSID Convention and the
BIT, which indicated, for instance, "the Tribunal shall apply the
law of the Contracting State party to the dispute .... ",151 Di Rosa
adds, however, that the Tribunal in the Siemens case flatly
rejected this argument on the grounds that questions of jurisdic-
tion are governed not by Article 42 of the Convention, but by Arti-
cle 25.152 The Tribunal deemed Argentine law "irrelevant" in
determinations of jurisdiction.1
3
Argentina also consistently objected that the issues raised by
the claimant "should be viewed as inherently sovereign determi-
nations immune from legal challenges . "..."154 In the CMS juris-
dictional proceeding, the claimants argued, "CMS's compensation
claim is not founded on the devaluation of the peso, but rather on
the loss in value of its investment due to Argentina's dismantling
of the dollar-based tariff regime."' 5 CMS further claimed that it
was not "complaining about general economic measures, but about
specific measures of Argentine federal authorities that breached
the commitments made towards CMS under the Treaty and inter-
not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre. The Secretary-General shall
forthwith transmit such notification to all Contracting States. Such notification shall
not constitute the consent required by paragraph (1)." ICSID Convention, supra note
32, art. 25.
147. See Jurisdictional Decision, 42 I.L.M at 790.
148. Id. ICSID Rule 41 governs tribunals' handling ofjurisdictional objections. See
ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), http://
www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/partF.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
149. See Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 51.
150. See id. at 51-57.
151. ICSID Convention, supra note 32, art. 42.
152. See Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 52 (citation omitted); see also ICSID Convention,
supra note 32, art. 25.
153. Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 52.
154. Id. at 53.
155. Jurisdictional Decision, 42 I.L.M. at 792 (footnote omitted).
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national law."156 The Tribunal, acknowledging CMS's arguments,
addressed this issue by distinguishing between "general economic
policy" and "specific measures ... of general economic policy hav-
ing a direct bearing" on the foreign investments.', 7 While in the
former case, the Tribunal noted that it "cannot pass judgment on
whether [the policies] are right or wrong," it held that in the latter
case it has jurisdiction.
58
The third grouping of preliminary objections that Di Rosa out-
lined involves "Exclusive Jurisdiction and Waiver of Other
Fora."" 9 Di Rosa frames the issue as follows:
whether (1) the dispute should be construed to involve only
a violation of the relevant contract (which, in those
instances where the contract contains an exclusive jurisdic-
tion clause pursuant to which the parties waive recourse to
all other fora, would arguably render such dispute subject
to resolution only in local Argentine courts), or whether (2)
the dispute involves damages suffered by the foreign inves-
tor itself pursuant to the relevant BIT (not the concession
contract), thereby engendering a cause of action under the
BIT and rendering the dispute cognizable by an interna-
tional arbitral tribunal. 6 °
As to these issues, ICSID Tribunals have held that "foreign inves-
tors' rights under the BITs are independent and separate from
those enjoyed under any contract with the State, and that the
BITs allow causes of action that are unrelated to those that may
arise under any contract.''
1
The final grouping of objections, those involving Ius Standi,
fundamentally address the issue of whether shareholders, as CMS
is to TGN, may seek damages through ICSID arbitration.'62
Argentina argued that shareholders are not entitled to seek dam-
ages independent of the company. 163 It further asserted that to
hold that shareholders may seek damages through arbitration
would result in "endless claims" from "attenuated and remote"
parties. 64 In the CMS case, specifically, Argentina asserted,
"TGN being the licensee, and CMS only a minority shareholder in
156. Id. at 793 (footnote omitted).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 54.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 57.
163. See id.
164. Id.
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this company, only TGN could claim for any damage suffered...
CMS is claiming not for direct damages, but for indirect damages
which could result from its minority participation in TGN."165 The
Tribunal soundly rejected this argument, holding that it could
"find[ ] no bar in current international law to the concept of
allowing claims by shareholders independently from those of the
corporation concerned, not even if those shareholders are minority
or non-controlling shareholders." '166
C. Merits Issues Addressed in CMS v. Argentine
Republic
Of the nearly forty cases filed before the ICSID stemming
from the Argentine financial crisis, CMS Gas Transmission Co. v.
Argentine Republic was the first (and thus far only one) to result
in an award.'6 ' Consequently, several merits issues addressed by
the CMS Tribunal are likely to have an impact on subsequent
Argentine arbitrations.'68 The Award, released on May 12, 2005,
found that Argentina "breached its obligations to accord the inves-
tor the fair and equitable treatment guaranteed in Article 11 (2) (a)
of the [BIT]," and that Argentina must pay CMS "compensation in
the amount of U.S. $133.2 million."'69 Additionally, the Tribunal
required that CMS transfer its remaining shares in TGN to
Argentina upon payment of U.S.$2.148 million.7 ° The Tribunal
also required Argentina to pay interest expenses.' 7 ' Although
Annulment proceedings have been initiated against this award,
17 2
the Tribunal's decisions on the individual merit issues before it
are ripe for study.'73
1. Interpretation of BIT "Umbrella Clauses"
Umbrella clauses, described as those "that obligate the Con-
165. Jurisdictional Decision, 44 I.L.M. at 793.
166. Id. at 795.
167. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, supra note 11.
168. See id.
169. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID No. ARB/01/8, 44
I.L.M. 1205, 1257 (2005).
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. For reasons discussed infra Part III.B, it would seem that the Annulment
proceedings requested by Argentina bear little chance of success.
173. Issue groupings are organized using Di Rosa's formulation of the major merit
issues that were before CMS Tribunal. Although no award had been rendered in the
case at the time of Di Rosa's publication, his framework is undoubtedly helpful. See
Di Rosa, supra note 1, at 61-72.
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tracting States to comply with any specific agreement or contract
they may have entered into ... with a foreign investor," are fairly
prevalent in BITs but nevertheless have been subject to varying
interpretations in ICSID arbitrations. 174 The issue of primary con-
cern is "whether they can be construed to elevate to the status of a
BIT violation ... a commitment by the host State with respect to
the investment."'75 Article II(2)(c) of the United States - Argen-
tina BIT explicitly states the following: "Each Party shall observe
any obligation it may have entered into with regard to
investments."76
Argentina argued against the application of the Treaty's
umbrella clause on the grounds that "no obligations were under-
taken by Argentina in respect of CMS, only in respect of TGN, and
the latter has not made any claim for contractual violation under
the License." 77 CMS responded, arguing,
all the commitments made by Argentina towards the
investment, whether under the legislation in force or con-
tractual arrangements, were breached as a result of the
measures adopted and particularly the dismantling of the
tariff regime and related matters. Therefore, the argument
follows, the umbrella clause of the Treaty has also been
breached.
17
Referring to Article II(2)(c) in the BIT, the Tribunal held that
the obligations under the treaty's umbrella clause had "not been
observed .. .to the extent that legal and contractual obligations
pertinent to the investment have been breached and have resulted
in the violation of the standards of protection under the Treaty."
79
The Tribunal specifically referenced:
two stabilization clauses contained in the License that have
significant effect when it comes to the protection extended
to them under the umbrella clause. The first is the obliga-
tion undertaken not to freeze the tariff regime or subject it
to price controls. The second is the obligation not to alter
the basic rules governing the License without TGN's writ-
174. Id. at 62.
175. Id.
176. Treaty with Argentina Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and
Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., art. II(2)(c), Nov. 14, 1991, 1991 U.S.T. LEXIS
176.
177. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID No. ARB/01/8, 44
I.L.M. 1205, 1216 (2005).
178. Id. at 1237.
179. Id. at 1238.
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ten consent."' 0
Given this rather broad interpretation of the U.S. - Argentina
BIT's "umbrella clause" Argentina should have some cause for
concern in future cases. However, given the non-binding nature of
ICSID precedent and the general disagreement among tribunals
as to the scope of umbrella clauses, it is not unlikely that other
tribunals reviewing Argentina cases may come to starkly dispa-
rate results with nearly identical facts. 81
2. Indirect Expropriation
Argument relating to issues of indirect expropriation dealt
specifically with Article IV(1) of the US - Argentina BIT which
states:
Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized
either directly or indirectly through measures tantamount
to expropriation or nationalization (expropriation-) except
for a public purpose; in a non-discriminatory manner; upon
payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation;
and in accordance with due process of law and the general
principles of treatment provided for in Article 11 (2) Com-
pensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of
the expropriated investment immediately before the
expropriatory action was taken or became known, which-
ever is earlier; be paid without delay; include interest at a
commercially reasonable rate from the date of expropria-
tion; be fully realizable; and be freely transferable at the
prevailing market rate of exchange on the date of
expropriation." 2
The Tribunal framed the question and defined indirect expropria-
tion as follows:
The essential question is therefore to establish whether the
enjoyment of the property has been effectively neutralized.
The standard that a number of tribunals have applied in
recent cases where indirect expropriation has been con-
tended is that of substantial deprivation. In the Metalclad
case the [T]ribunal held that this kind of expropriation
relates to incidental interference with the use of property
which has "the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in
180. Id.
181. See Di Rosa, supra note 1, at n.63 (using two arbitration awards to show the
varying findings as to the scope of umbrella clauses).
182. See Treaty with Argentina Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and
Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., art. LV(l), Nov. 14, 1991, 1991 U.S.T. LEXIS 176.
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significant part, of the use or reasonable-to-be-expected
economic benefit of the property even if not necessarily to
the obvious benefit of the host State."
1 8 3
As damages for the alleged expropriation, CMS sought "full com-
pensation for these breaches in terms of recovering the fair mar-
ket value of the investment calculated immediately before the
date of expropriation.""18
In response to CMS's indirect expropriation argument, Argen-
tina asserted that "TGN has continued to operate normally and
has full use of its property and there has been no redistribution of
wealth of any kind nor has there been an intention to do so... ,"188
Argentina further noted that the State had not "derived any bene-
fit from the measures taken," and that the measures adopted were
"temporary. "18
6
The Tribunal initially acknowledged that both parties "are in
agreement that no direct expropriation has taken place. 118 7 Citing
an earlier case, the Tribunal further refined its definition of indi-
rect expropriation, characterizing it as a measure that "effectively
neutralized the enjoyment of the property.""88
The Tribunal ultimately held, somewhat summarily, that
indirect expropriation did not occur in this case, noting:
The Government of Argentina has convincingly argued that
the list of issues to be taken into account for reaching a
determination on substantial deprivation, as discussed in
that case, is not present in the instant dispute. In fact, the
Respondent has explained, the investor is in control of the
investment; the Government does not manage the day-to-
day operations of the company; and the investor has full
ownership and control of the investment.8 9
3. Fair and Equitable Treatment
Perhaps the most significant development in the CMS case
that will undoubtedly have a bearing on future cases was the
Tribunals' handling of the US - Argentina BIT's "fair and equita-
ble" treatment clause. The principle of "fair and equitable" treat-
ment, as Professor Peter Muchlinski notes, "is a cornerstone of the
183. CMS Gas, 44 I.L.M. at 1234 (quoting Metaclad, 40 I.L.M. 55 (2001), para. 103).
184. Id. at 1248.
185. Id. at 1233.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1234.
188. Id. (citation omitted).
189. Id.
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evolving international law on the protection of investors and their
investments." 190 The near-ubiquitous presence of such clauses in
BITs makes a clarification of this standard, as asserted by the
CMS Tribunal, a worrisome development for Argentina. Professor
Muchlinski further discusses the modern development of the
standard:
Thus it is now reasonably well settled that the standard
requires a particular approach to governance on the part of
the host country that is encapsulated in the obligations to
act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and in total
transparency, without arbitrariness and in accordance with
the principle of good faith. In addition, investors can expect
due process in the handling of their claims and to have the
host authorities act in a manner that is non-discriminatory
and proportionate to the policy aims involved. These will
include the need to observe the goal of creating favourable
investment conditions and the observance of the legitimate
commercial expectations of the investor. On the other
hand, the standard is case specific and requires a flexible
approach given that, "it offers a general point of departure
in formulating an argument that the foreign investor has
not been well treated by reason of discriminatory or other
unfair measures that have been taken against its
interest." 9'
The relevant portion of the Argentina - US treaty, Article
II(2)(a), specifically requires that "[i]nvestment shall at all times
be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protec-
tion and security and shall in no case be accorded treatment less
than that required by international law."'92 CMS argued that
ICSID precedent seemed to interpret the standard as requiring
"the Contacting Parties to provide international investments
treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were
taken into account by the investors to make the investment."'93
Argentina, conversely, argued that "none of the measures adopted
190. See Peter Muchlinski, 'Caveat Investor'? The Relevance of the Conduct of the
Investor Under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
527 (2006).
191. Id. at 530-31 (footnotes omitted) (quoting PT MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 625 (Blackwell Oxford ed., 1999)).
192. Treaty with Argentina Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and
Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., art. II(2)(a), Nov. 14, 1991, 1991 U.S.T. LEXIS
176.
193. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID No. ARB/01i8,
44 I.L.M. 1205, 1234 (2005) (citation omitted).
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[in Law 25561] breaches the standard.., as the legislative prerog-
atives of the State cannot be frozen in time and the Emergency
Law is just one such exercise of its prerogative."194
Noting that "the measures that are complained [by CMS] did
in fact entirely transform and alter the legal and business envi-
ronment under which the investment was decided and made, "
the Tribunal concluded that "the measures adopted resulted in the
objective beach of the standard laid down" in the treaty. 96 In
reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal markedly asserted that bad
faith was not an "essential element" of the fair and equitable
treatment standard, although such a showing "can aggravate the
situation."97
4. Force Majeure
Finally, Argentina argued in the alternative that given the
"severe economic, social and political crisis" which threatened "the
very existence of the Argentine State," it should be "exempted
from liability" due to "the existence of a state of necessity or a
state of emergency."19' Argentina's assertion of the state of neces-
sity argument, a fundamental principle of international law,
relied upon the contention that it "did not contribute to the crea-
tion of the state of necessity in a substantive way."'99 To that end,
Argentina argued that the economic crisis was "prompted for the
most part by exogenous factors."2"' CMS countered these asser-
tions, arguing that the conflict did not involve grave or imminent
peril and that most of the causes of the financial crisis were, in
fact, internal.2 '
The Tribunal, in considering Argentina's assertion, first noted
that the state of necessity argument is "an exceptional one and
has to be addressed in a prudent manner to avoid abuse."20 2 Prin-
cipally, however, it concluded that Argentina's claim must be
rejected on the grounds that Argentina played a "substantial" role
in the creation of the crisis.2°3 The Tribunal noted,
194. Id. at 1235.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1236.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1238.
199. Id. at 1239.
200. Id.
201. See id.
202. Id. at 1240.
203. See id. at 1241.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:3
[t]he crisis was not of the making of one particular adminis-
tration and found its roots in the earlier crisis of the 1980s
and evolving governmental policies of the 1990s that
reached a zenith in 2002 and thereafter. Therefore, the
Tribunal observes that government policies and their short-
comings significantly contributed to the crisis and the
emergency and while exogenous factors did fuel additional
difficulties they do not exempt the Respondent from its
responsibility in the matter. 4
This methodical rejection of one of Argentina's primary arguments
against the enforcement of CMS' claim will likely resonate, to the
chagrin of the Argentine government.
III. ARGENTINE POLITICAL INTERFERENCE
IN ICSID ARBITRATIONS
Bearing in mind the political and diplomatic style of the
Kirchner administration and the notably, and perhaps conse-
quently, uncompromising tenor with which Argentina has
approached this particular arbitration, one must consider the
extent to which politics has played a role and will continue to play
a role in the ongoing and future challenges the CMS arbitration
will face. During his meeting in Spain with business leaders,2"5
ABC, a leading Spanish daily noted, "[h]is message was motivated
by electoral matters. He was interested in sending a message to
Argentines of toughness with Spanish businesses."2 6 While ABC's
skeptical observation may have been subjective, it is not unrea-
sonable to allow it some credence and to use it as an assumption
informing analysis of Mr. Kirchner's continued motives in chal-
lenging the ICSID's authority.
A Presidential Election is set for October of 2007,207 and the
front-runner in the race will be a Kirchner - either Mr. Kirchner
or his wife, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner.2 8 Among the oppo-
nents that have already announced that they will also be candi-
dates are former President Menem and Kirchner's former finance
204. Id. at 1242.
205. See discussion supra Part I.C.
206. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 101, at 167 (translation by author).
207. See Benedict Mander, Lavagna to Run in Presidential Poll, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 6, 2007, (Americas) at 2.
208. See Patrick J. McDonnell, First Lady May Have Eye on Husband's Job; Stylish
Argentine Senator is Being Called the 'New Evita', L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2007, at A14;
Estudian Possible Candidature de la Primera Dama, DIARio LAS AMERICAS, Feb. 26,
2007.
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minister, Roberto Lavagna. 2°9 The race is certain to be contested
and Kirchner will have a significant interest in the race's outcome.
Therefore, several scenarios must be considered regarding the
future of the CMS case, assuming, that the ICSID cases will be
relevant to the campaigns as they have been in the past. Three
developments are discussed at length: the Outcome of the Annul-
ment Proceedings, Constitutional challenges to Enforceability,
and the use of informal pressure tactics to force settlements.
A. The Annulment Proceeding: Effort to Prolong Final
Resolution
The ICSID Annulment procedure is distinctive when com-
pared to an appeal to a national court to set aside an award.21 °
There is no tribunal higher than the ICSID which hears these
"appeals;" instead, an ad hoc committee of three arbitrators is
formed by the Secretary-General of the ICSID to hear the requests
for annulment.2" The ICSID Convention provides only five basis
for annulment:
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that
the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; (c) that
there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribu-
nal; (d) that there has been a serious departure from a fun-
damental rule of procedure; or (e) that the award has failed
to state the reasons on which it is based.212
Argentina filed a Request for Annulment with the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the ICSID on September 8, 2005.213 Pursuant to Article 52
(4) of the ICSID Convention, the Committee consequently agreed
to stay the enforcement of the award.214
In requesting the stay, Argentina argued that enforcing the
award while waiting for the annulment proceeding would "'irrepa-
rably harm"' its interests.2 5 It also argued the stay "'would not
prejudice CMS.' ' 216 CMS, in turn, argued for rejection of the stay
209. See Mander, supra note 207; Jude Webber, Former Argentine Leader Plots His
Comeback, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 6, 2007, (Americas) at 2.
210. See NATHAN, supra note 21, at 68.
211. See id. at 67-68.
212. ICSID Convention, supra note 32, art. 52(1).
213. See Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine
Rep. Application for Annulment, ICSID No. ARB/01/8, para. 1, http://www.iisd.org/
pdff2005/investsd-cmsannulment.petition.pdf (providing the decision on the
Argentine Republic's request for a continued stay of enforcement of the award).
214. See id. para. 52.
215. Id. para. 15 (quoting the Argentine Republic's request for annulment).
216. Id. (quoting the Argentine Republic's request for annulment).
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request barring "adequate assurances" from Argentina that, in
the event that the annulment failed, they would pay the Award.217
CMS pointed to statements made by Argentine government offi-
cials expressing its intention to "subject final ICSID Awards 'to a
novel domestic review mechanism before the Argentine Supreme
Court ... .,"'218 The Tribunal agreed to grant Argentina's request
only after receiving a written guarantee from an Argentine official
claiming that final ICSID Awards would be recognized.
219 CMS
was doubtful of the value of the letter, noting that it is not binding
on Argentina, but the Tribunal ignored its objections.220
B. Constitutional Challenges to Enforceability
Despite the Tribunal's apparent faith in the commitment
made to enforce the Award if Annullment procedures failed, CMS
was justified in relying on a clear record indicating that senior
Argentine officials consistently expressed the possibility of not
recognizing the Award.221  Among the prominent officials who
have spoken on the matter, Horacio Rosatti, Argentina's Justice
Minister, "argue[d] that ICSID ha[d] no jurisdiction over Argen-
tina. '222 Also, the former Economy Minister and a current candi-
date for President, Roberto Lavagna, noted that the Supreme
Court could find that the ICSID rulings are incompatible with the
Constitution. 223 Finally, President Kircher, himself has "indicated
that he will ignore any rulings against the government."224
After the announcement of the Award, several Argentine
elected officials began to act upon the threats that Government
Ministers and the President have long been asserting:
Argentina's initial official reaction to the ICSID award in
favor of the CMS Gas Transmission Company was to reject
the ruling, stating that it would not pay. Furthermore,
there were attempts by high-ranking government officials
to pass a law rejecting all ICSID rulings on privatized utili-
ties. The opposition ARI party in Congress went even fur-
ther, presenting two bills, one calling for the recision of all
217. Id. para. 16 (quoting CMS"letter dated September 30, 2007 arguing against
enforcement of a stay).
218. Id. para. 18 (quoting CMS' letter dated May 16, 2006). The validity of this
threat is addressed further, infra Part III.C.
219. See id. para. 28.
220. See id. para. 29.
221. See id. paras. 27-32.
222. ECONOMIST, Getting Serious, supra note 102, at 97.
223. See id.
224. See ECONOMIST, Taking on Foreigners, supra note 104, at 4.
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BITs and the other calling for the recision of Argentina's
signatory status to the treaty that establishes the jurisdic-
tion of the ICSID as a valid international court for invest-
ment disputes.225
Other commentators confirm the machinations discussed above
but also openly speculate about potential rulings of the Argentine
Supreme Court, noting
the Argentine Government has recently been evaluating
the enactment of laws granting the Supreme Court juris-
diction to entirely review the ICSID awards ... the current
majority of the Supreme Court - appointed by this Govern-
ment - seemed to be ideologically inclined to support gov-
ernment intervention . . . no rulings against the main
policies of the Government are likely to be expected.226
Two general approaches for the possible challenge of ICSID
Awards have been outlined. The first involves the "basic" Argen-
tine Constitutional principle that international treaties are subor-
dinated to the National Constitution.227 Under this approach, any
ICSID awards would have to pass muster with domestic public
policy principles.228 The second approach, described as more "radi-
cal," entails the nullification of the ICSID Convention on the
grounds that it failed to complete the validity requirements
imposed by the new system of approving treaties that the Argen-
tine Congress passed in 1994.229 This approach would annul all
claims involving Argentina currently before the ICSID.23 0 While
the rejection of ICSID Awards by Argentina is certainly plausible,
some commentators argue that it is unlikely.23' Osvaldo
Marzorati, an Argentine law professor and international practi-
225. Alan Cibils, ICSID Bleeds Argentina, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, July/Aug.
2005, available at http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2005/072005/front.html.
226. Carlos E. Alfaro and Pedro Lorenti (Alfaro-Abogados), The Enforcement
Process Of The ICSID Awards: Procedural Issues And Domestic Public Policy,
MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, June 1, 2005, available at http://www.mondaq.comlarticle.
asp?articleid=32803&lastestnews=1.
227. Carlos E. Alfaro and Pedro Lorenti (Alfaro-Abogados), Argentina vs. ICSID:
Unconstitutionality of the BITs and ICSID Jurisdiction - the Potential New
Government Defenses Against the Enforcement of the ICSID Arbitral Award - Issues
That May Subject the Award to Revision by the Argentine Judiciary, Mondaq Bus.





231. See Osvaldo J. Marzorati, Enforcement of Treaty Awards and National
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tioner, points out that Argentina has generally respected arbitra-
tion rulings in the past regarding border disputes, international
trade, and international affairs.2 32 However, he notes that "[t]ime
will show whether politics or strict legal considerations prevail on
this issue .... 233
C. "Extra-Judicial" Tactics: Pressure Placed on
Companies to Withdraw Claims
Given the remarkable turnaround that the Argentine econ-
omy experienced a mere two years after the crash, Argentina has
once again become a favorable market for foreign investment.
Consequently, several companies, seeking to return to Argentina,
have opted to withdraw their ICSID claims as "gestures of good-
will."234 These "gestures," however, do not seem entirely volun-
tary. In fact, the Government has consistently required
withdrawal of ICSID claims as a condition for the renegotiation of
contacts,235 although negotiation is required under the terms of
Law 25561.236 On several occasions, Argentine officials and even
the President have noted that they would apply financial pres-
sure, through contract renegotiation, on those investors that
remain in Argentina to withdraw their claims. 7
IV. CONCLUSIONS: A PYRRHIC VICTORY?
Given the conditions discussed above: a deliberate but unt-
ested arbitral body moving obstinately towards the likely imposi-
tion of significant awards against Argentina, and a government,
disdainful towards the ICSID and suspicious of foreign invest-
ment generally - there would seem to be a clash soon in the mak-
ing. President Kirchner has built a national following based on
his tough "K-style," and the coming year is certainly not the most
opportune time for him to abandon that persona, given that Presi-
232. See id.
233. Id. at 247.
234. See Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Investment Treaty News Archive, http:/!
www.iisd.org/investment/itn/archive.asp (follow hyperlink for Apr. 8, 2005).
235. See Carlos E. Alfaro (Alfaro-Abogados), Argentina's Impressive Economic
Recovery and the Debt Swap, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, Apr. 7, 2005, available at http://
www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=31899&lastestnews=1.
236. See Law No. 25561, art. 11, Jan. 6, 2002, [LXII-A] A.D.L.A. 44.
237. See RANSE W. HOWELL, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, CAN THERE
BE AN ALTERNATIVE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM TO
ARBITRATION? (Aug. 2000), http://www.cedr.co.uk/index.php?location=/library/articles/
20060829_179.htm.
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dential elections are scheduled for October 2007. Like two trains
rushing towards one another on the same track, the destructive
result seems inevitable.
Were Argentina to reject the imposition of ICSID awards,
however, what would it gain? A victory, perhaps, but surely a pyr-
rhic one. Although the short-term political rewards would be con-
siderable, it is just as likely that the long-term consequences could
be devastating. Diminished foreign investment and tense rela-
tions with among the world's largest lending institutions cannot
bode well for a nation only five years removed from a total eco-
nomic collapse. Beyond the macroeconomic effects, though, cer-
tain consequences have already become apparent. On March 20,
2007, Argentina's major newspaper, La Nacion, reported that a
group of representatives from the utility industry labor union Luz
y Fuerza warned President Kirchner of the "worrisome" state of
Argentina's electrical sector."' The present situation, described
as an "energy crisis," would be exacerbated, the union officials
noted, by significant expected increases in demand for electric-
ity.239 This warning illustrates the fundamental conflict at stake.
Undoubtedly, as previous Argentine governments understood,
substantial foreign investment must be an essential aspect of any
plan to overhaul its infrastructure. However, the extent of such
investment and its potential positive effects on the economic well-
being of the Republic would certainly be circumscribed by anti-
investment policies adopted by the political leadership of
Argentina.
As the Greek leader Pyrrhus noted after defeating the
Romans in a battle, "Another such victory over the Romans and
we are undone."24 Here, too, a short-term victory would yield
greater difficulties in the long-run.
238. See Advertencia Gremial a Kirchner por La Crisis Energetica, LA NACI6N
[Arg.], Mar. 20, 2007.
239. See id.
240. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 82 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).
